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  • Search: isPartOf:"RAND Journal of Economics"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Theorie 813 Theory 813 USA 288 United States 288 Agency theory 105 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 105 Asymmetric information 87 Asymmetrische Information 87 Market entry 80 Markteintritt 80 Preismanagement 79 Pricing strategy 79 Oligopol 72 Oligopoly 72 Game theory 68 Spieltheorie 68 Consumer behaviour 65 Konsumentenverhalten 65 Competition 63 Monopol 62 Monopoly 62 Wettbewerb 62 Auktionstheorie 61 Regulation 61 Regulierung 61 Auction theory 60 Innovation 52 Preiswettbewerb 48 Price competition 48 Market structure 47 Marktstruktur 47 Leistungsanreiz 45 Performance incentive 45 Product quality 45 Produktqualität 45 Patent 43 Moral Hazard 42 Moral hazard 41 Merger 40 Fusion 39
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Online availability
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Undetermined 1,122 Free 42
Type of publication
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Article 3,773 Book / Working Paper 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 1,426 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1,426 Article 7 Collection of articles of several authors 5 Sammelwerk 5 Conference proceedings 3 Konferenzschrift 3 Market information 1 Marktinformation 1
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Language
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Undetermined 2,182 English 1,592
Author
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Tirole, Jean 49 Daughety, Andrew F. 35 Martimort, David 31 Lewis, Tracy R. 30 Chen, Yongmin 25 Inderst, Roman 25 Rey, Patrick 24 Biglaiser, Gary 23 Che, Yeon-Koo 23 Hermalin, Benjamin E. 23 Jullien, Bruno 23 Reinganum, Jennifer F. 23 Schankerman, Mark 22 Borenstein, Severin 20 Laffont, Jean-Jacques 20 Bagwell, Kyle 19 Choi, Jay Pil 19 Whinston, Michael D. 19 Riordan, Michael H. 18 Scotchmer, Suzanne 18 Farrell, Joseph 17 Fershtman, Chaim 17 Spier, Kathryn E. 17 Doraszelski, Ulrich 16 Dranove, David 16 Jehiel, Philippe 16 Saloner, Garth 16 Shepard, Andrea 16 Vives, Xavier 16 Waldman, Michael 16 Besanko, David 15 Katz, Michael L. 15 Klemperer, Paul 15 Sappington, David E.M. 15 Shapiro, Carl 15 Gilbert, Richard J. 14 Gowrisankaran, Gautam 14 Lerner, Josh 14 Reinganum, Jennifer Freidel 14 Shaffer, Greg 14
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Institution
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Institut d'Économie Industrielle <Toulouse> 1 Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion 1 Symposium on the Economics of the Internet and Software Industries <2001, Toulouse> 1
Published in...
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The Rand journal of economics 2,290 RAND Journal of Economics 1,323 The RAND Journal of Economics 160 Symposium on the economics of organization 13 Discussion Paper 1 Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik - Papers on Strategic Interaction 1 RAND Journal of Economics, 36(4) 2002, 890-907 1
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Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 1,433 RePEc 1,323 OLC EcoSci 857 Other ZBW resources 153 EconStor 7 USB Cologne (business full texts) 1
Showing 3,491 - 3,500 of 3,774
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Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings
Rubinfeld, Daniel L.; Sappington, David E.M. - In: RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987) 2, pp. 308-315
We view the court system as an institution that enables defendants to signal their innocence or guilt, and we examine how the court can optimally minimize expected social losses from errors of type I and type II and from expenditures by defendants. Two of the policy instruments assumed available...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353871
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On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts
Cremer, Jacques; Riordan, Michael H. - In: RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987) 3, pp. 436-451
Bilateral contracts, while neither negotiated nor enforced in an integrated way, are nevertheless often interrelated both economically and strategically owing to production or consumption complementarities and to asymmetric information. A set of bilateral contracts forms a mechanism with special...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353886
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Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry
Farrell, Joseph - In: RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987) 1, pp. 34-39
We show how costless, nonbinding, nonverifiable communication (cheap talk) can achieve partial coordination among potential entrants into a natural-monopoly industry, where the payoffs are qualitatively like the "battle of the sexes." The analysis would apply equally in other economic situations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353901
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Licensing to Enhance Demand for New Technologies
Shepard, Andrea - In: RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987) 3, pp. 360-368
This article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and, therefore, may be a profit-maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost. In the model buyers care about price and quality, sellers can contract on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353908
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The Demand for Local Telephone Service: A Fully Discrete Model of Residential Calling Patterns and Service Choices
Train, Kenneth E.; McFadden, Daniel L.; Ben-Akiva, Moshe - In: RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987) 1, pp. 109-123
We present an empirical model of households' choices among local telephone service options (for example, between flat-rate and measured service) and the interrelation of these choices with the number and average duration of local calls households make at each time of day to each geographical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353931
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Optimality and Sustainability: Regulation and Intermodal Competition in Telecommunications
Einhorn, Michael A. - In: RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987) 4, pp. 550-563
As regulators continue to open utility markets to entry, new market contestants may specialize in providing service for the utility's largest customers. Consequently, old utility pricing procedures may no longer be sustainable. Taking telecommunications regulation as an example, this article...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353939
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The Costs of Price Regulation: Lessons from Railroad Deregulation
Boyer, Kenneth D. - In: RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987) 3, pp. 408-416
Previous calculations of the costs of railroad rate regulation assumed that deregulation would lower railroad rate levels and allow railroads to capture significant amounts of traffic from other modes of transportation. This article presents empirical results that show that neither of these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005354008
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Investment and Coordination in Oligopolistic Industries
Gilbert, Richard J.; Lieberman, Marvin - In: RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987) 1, pp. 17-33
We examine investment by firms in 24 chemical product industries to determine whether firms invest preemptively to achieve persistent increases in market share or whether there is evidence of behavior to maintain market share. The data indicate that investment reduces the probability that rival...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005354013
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A Theory of Market Structure with Sequential Entry
Eaton, B. Curtis; Ware, Roger - In: RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987) 1, pp. 1-16
This article sets out a theory of market structure with sequential entry. We characterize the perfect Nash equilibrium to the entry game in several propositions. First, equilibria never involve excess capacity. Second, a sufficient statistic for the entry of any firm is that its profits are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357017
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Rate-Setting by Diagnosis Related Groups and Hospital Specialization
Dranove, David - In: RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987) 3, pp. 417-427
Under the system of hospital reimbursement for Medicare patients, hospitals receive a prospectively determined price that varies according to the diagnosis related group (DRG) to which the patient is assigned. Rate-setting by DRG encourages hospitals to specialize in those DRGs for which they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357020
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