There are often benefits to consumers and to firms from standardization of a product. We examine whether these standardization benefits can "trap" an industry in an obsolete or inferior standard when there is a better alternative available. With complete information and identical preferences...

This article presents evidence for the existence of value-of-service pricing in the never-regulated market for trucking services to haul Florida produce. Rates per truckload are found to increase by eleven to twelve cents for every one dollar increase in the average daily loss in the value of...

This article studies the relationships among the concepts of subsidy-free prices, anonymously equitable prices, supportability, and sustainability. In particular, we set out conditions under which these concepts are not vacuous. Several new sets of conditions under which a subsidy-free price...

We analyze free-entry equilibrium in a model of spatial competition in which locations of established firms are fixed and entrants' profit expectations are rational. Our most interesting results concern large economies -- economies in which the number of firms is arbitrarily large. When the...

This article analyzes a two-period game where firms can produce inventory in the first period for sale in the second period. We assume that revenues and costs are time invariant and that the firms are symmetric. We focus on the nature and the existence of the subgame perfect equilibrium of this...

This article uses an infinite-regress model of firm-level decisions to find a rational expectations equilibrium for a duopoly and to relate concepts of conjectural variations and consistency to the Cournot equilibrium. The model derives a conjectural variation instead of assuming it. In...

Many regulations impose lighter requirements on smaller firms than on larger firms. Such differential treatment is known as tiering. This article presents a framework for analyzing tiering. It assumes that regulators use taxes to reduce negative externalities, that the collection of taxes...

We study a three-stage, asymmetric duopoly game of R&D rivalry. The stages are: (1) development of an innovation; (2) fixed-fee licensing of the innovation; and (3) sale of the final product. We find that major innovations will not be licensed, but that equally efficient firms will tend to...