type="main" <p>Earlier research has shown that the tragedy of the commons may be resolved by Folk theorems for dynamic games. In this article, we graft on a standard natural-resource exploitation game the possibility to appropriate the resource through violent means. Because conflict emerges...</p>

type="main" <p>We analyze the sustainability of a conversation when one agent might be endowed with a piece of private information that affects the payoff distribution to its benefit. Such a secret can compromise the sustainability of conversation. Even without an obligation, the secret holder will...</p>

type="main" <p>This article estimates the causal effect of retirement-induced workload spikes on the selection of procurement terms. In a sample of 150,000 contracts from 85 procurement offices over 11 years, increases in workload decrease reliance on competitive acquisition procedures, decrease...</p>

type="main" <p>This article presents a dynamic demand model for motor vehicles. This approach accounts for the change in the mix of consumers over the model year and measures consumers' substitution patterns across products and time. I find intertemporal substitution is significant; consumers are...</p>

type="main" <p>We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration when firms exert market power upstream and compete in quantities downstream. Contrasting with previous literature, a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency gains dominate...</p>

type="main" <p>We study the interaction between a group of agents who exert effort to complete a project and a manager who chooses its objectives. The manager has limited commitment power so that she can commit to the objectives only when the project is sufficiently close to completion. We show...</p>

type="main" <p>A sender-receiver game a la Crawford-Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff-relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic...</p>

type="main" <p>I consider how different managerial traits affect the authority relation between a principal and his agent. An increase in the principal's domain knowledge—which enhances his capability to verify the agent's recommendations—leads to an increase in the proportion of the agent's...</p>

type="main" <p>Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play-hardball...</p>

type="main" <p>I generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in demand. Empirical work has shown income effects to be positive and statistically significant. Income effects deliver theoretical results consistent with regulatory concern about excessive termination...</p>