Wireless operators often outsource the task of creating content to independent content providers in the mobile Internet market. Revenue streams of the mobile Internet market typically consist of two main sources, data traffic and content sales. It is often the case that only the revenue from...

The paper offers a roadmap to the current economic thinking concerning interchange fees. After describing the fundamental externalities inherent in payment systems and analysing merchant resistance to interchange fee increases and the associations' determination of this fee, it derives the...

Static demand models for homogeneous network goods give rise to fulfilled-expectations equilibrium demand (FEED) curves, which, contrary to normal demand curves, may be upward sloping at certain intervals. We analyze some, as yet unexplored, properties of the FEED curves. We spell out the...

This paper examines the evolution of airline business models and network structure decisions in the passenger aviation industry. The paper reviews the growth of hub-and-spoke networks as the dominant business model following deregulation in the latter part of the 20th century, followed by the...

In this paper, I model competition between legal and pirate products. In this framework, the government affects competition through police spending and taxes on the legal products. Therefore, the government can choose the optimal combination of spending and taxes that fit better its goals. I...

In this short comment, I provide my views on "Market Power and Efficiency in Card Payment Systems" (published in this issue) that was presented at the Antitrust Activity in Card-Based Payment Systems: Causes and Consequences conference, and more generally on the ideas introduced by Rochet and...

A payment instrument that disproportionately charges merchants (as with high interchange) can take business from others that offer the two-sided customer better deals. This competitive bias arises because merchants internalize cardholders' benefits (even without merchant competition). Use of an...

The paper offers a roadmap to the current economic thinking concerning interchange fees. After describing the fundamental externalities inherent in payment systems and analysing merchant resistance to interchange fee increases and the associations' determination of this fee, it derives the...

In this short comment, I provide my views on "Market Power and Efficiency in Card Payment Systems" (published in this issue) that was presented at the Antitrust Activity in Card-Based Payment Systems: Causes and Consequences conference, and more generally on the ideas introduced by Rochet and...

A payment instrument that disproportionately charges merchants (as with high interchange) can take business from others that offer the two-sided customer better deals. This competitive bias arises because merchants internalize cardholders' benefits (even without merchant competition). Use of an...