We investigate the welfare implications of changing a proportional capital income tax for a model economy in which heterogeneous households face labor income risk and trade only one asset. Labor taxes are adjusted at the time of the reform to maintain long run budget balance. Our stochastic...

Denna översikt över prissättning och konkurrens på läkemedelsmarknaden syftar till att översiktligt diskutera de nya förutsättningarna på den svenska läkemedelsmarknaden och implikationerna för hur vi i framtiden väljer att reglera läkemedelsmarknaden. Ett ökande kostnadsansvar...

The paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold-up problem. At a first stage, one agent decides on the level of a relationship-specific investment. There is no contract, so at a second stage the agent must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the investment has...

Both proximity-concentration trade-off and factor proportions explanations have been forwarded to explain the existence of multinational enterprises. This paper analyses to what extent these different explanations are supported empirically, in making a first attempt to distinguish explicitly...

Most literature on the hold-up problem starts from the assumption that ex post bargaining outcomes are insensitive to prior investment costs. We argue that this approach is unsatisfactory. If the bargaining procedure is relatively symmetric, it typically admits multiple perfect equilibria, some...

In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Joseph A. Schumpeter concluded that socialism would eventually displace capitalism in Western democracies. This would come about as a result of the superior performance of capitalism. We extract six "stylized" propositions that are essential elements of...

This paper considers maximum likelihood estimation and inference in the two-way random effects model with serial correlation. We derive a straightforward maximum likelihood estimator when the time-specific component follow an AR(1) or MA(1) process. The estimator is easily generalized to...

We propose a panel regression model with a predetermined and fixed number of classes, where each class is defined by its parameters, but any reference as to which group any observation belongs to is absent. The classes or groups are rationalized by a willingness to attribute some of the observed...

In this paper we study a sender-receiver game between an uninformed government and two informed lobbyists. There is a conflict of interest between government and lobbyists in the sense that the government's payoff is state-dependent while lobbyists prefer a certain policy irrespective of the...

In this paper we show the consequences of applying a panel unit root test when testing for a purchasing power parity relationship. The distribution of the tests investigated, including the IPS test of Im et al (1997), are influenced by a common stochastic trend which is usually not accounted...