Headquarters and their specialized component suppliers have a vital interest in establishing long-term collaborations. When formal contracts are not enforceable, such efficiency-enhancing cooperations can be established via informal agreements, but relational contracts have been largely ignored...

We revisit the effects of double tax treaties on foreign direct investment. Previous empirical studies provide somewhat counterintuitive results suggesting insignificant or even negative effects of tax treaties. Using a rich firm-level dataset provided by the German Central Bank we analyze the...

To assess to what extent collective job displacements can be regarded as unanticipated exogenous shocks for affected employees, we analyze plant-level employment patterns before bankruptcy, plant closure without bankruptcy, and mass layoff. Utilizing administrative data covering all West German...

Foundation owned firms are an interesting research object to test ownership influence on firms' performance. Research claims that the foundation as an organization without natural owner leads to significant agency cost because there is no residual claimant with an incentive to control....

We analyze monopoly power in a market for a complementary fossil resource like oil in a two country/two period model with international trade in general equilibrium. Focusing on the complex interplay of capital and resource market, we elaborate how these effects feed back into the resource...

Final good production often requires a firm's headquarter services and a foreign supplier's manufacturing input. With incomplete contracts, firms that decide whether to choose integration or outsourcing of this supplier do not only have to consider the ex ante investment incentives that...

In this paper, I analyze incomplete enforcement in a political economy model. I use a contest framework to explain changes in lobbying behavior when special interest groups anticipate the incomplete enforceability of environmental regulation. In this setting, I compare two instruments, namely an...

When a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks to subordinates, these subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents. As a new manager is less well acquainted with these talents this incentive mechanism is reinvigorated after a...

Using a representative establishment data set for Germany, we show that, in line with the existing literature for several countries, firms' adjustment costs for employment are characterized by a fixed and convex functional form. Furthermore, they are asymmetric with dismissal costs exceeding...

We provide evidence on the growth patterns of microfinance clients. Our analysis is motivated by the debate on the impact of microfinance on client income and growth. Based on loan-level data from close to 40,000 clients in Sub-Saharan Africa we make use of an econometric approach widely...