Managers like to think well of themselves, and of the firms that employ them. However, positive illusions can bias a manager's evaluation of market outcomes, self-servingly crediting success on the superior quality of one's own product but blaming failure on the aggressive price of a...

To examine the impact of globalization on managerial compensation, we consider a matching model where firms compete both in the product market and in the managerial market. We show that globalization, that is, the simultaneous integration of product markets and managerial pools, leads to an...

We study the role of transparency in a novel three-person profit sharing game in which managers and board directors decide on how to distribute the revenues of a company among themselves and shareholders, who are the residual claimants of the companies revenues. We examine two hypotheses. One is...

We study the role of transparency in a novel three-person profit sharing game in which managers and board directors decide on how to distribute the revenues of a company among themselves and shareholders, who are the residual claimants of the companies revenues. We examine two hypotheses. One is...

To examine the impact of globalization on managerial compensation, we consider a matching model where firms compete both in the product market and in the managerial market. We show that globalization, that is, the simultaneous integration of product markets and managerial pools, leads to an...

Managers like to think well of themselves, and of the firms that employ them. However, positive illusions can bias a manager's evaluation of market outcomes, self-servingly crediting success on the superior quality of one's own product but blaming failure on the aggressive price of a...