Multilateral funding for global environmental protection, such as biodiversity conservation, requires donor participation. When are donors willing to participate? We examine a game-theoretic model of multilateral funding for environmental projects in developing countries. Donors must first...

This paper analyses the optimal type and degree of commitment to a future climate policy when damage costs from climate change are uncertain. Taking uncertainty into account, it is shown within the framework of a sequential game between firms and a regulator that commitment to an emission...

In this paper, a model of an ecosystem influenced by a large human population is presented. It is modelled by a discrete time dynamic game with many players and a simple dynamics. The paper proposes a new way to look at the problems of exploitation of ecosystems by many users — using the...

In this paper, we show that the participation by an environmental group in a permit market does not necessarily result in more investment in abatement or even less pollution. There is a U-shaped relationship between the emission per unit of output and the extra weight given by the environmental...

We consider the effect of an increase in the risk from pollution. We show that in the case of a flow pollution, when the number of players is sufficiently large, the result of Bramoulle and Treich [<italic>Journal of the European Economic Association</italic>, 2009], showing that a marginal increase of risk in...

We consider a renewable resource being exploited in common by firms that compete both in the output market and in the exploitation of the resource. We show that the introduction of the slightest cost differentiation among the firms can have a drastic effect on the nature of the equilibria that...

We incorporate matching schemes into a model of transboundary environmental agreements and investigate their effectiveness using three-stage game models. In the first stage, each country decides whether to accede to the agreement. In the second stage, the signatories collectively choose a common...

When users have <italic>ex-ante</italic> demands over a common resource and when resource size is not sufficient to cover all the individual demands, there is a need to establish a rationing rule. I test whether the choice of the rationing rule impacts the individual decision to self-insure, i.e., to invest in a...

We consider a duopolistic industry in which pollution is a by-product of production and firms are given emission permits that they can trade. The common wisdom is that allowing for trade in emission permits promotes efficiency. We demonstrate that this common wisdom cannot automatically be...

This paper investigates the stability of agreements for sharing fish stocks among coastal states when migrations patterns change — a heretofore largely unexplored topic. The case investigated is the agreement on sharing the mackerel stock (<italic>Scomber scombrus</italic>) in the North-east Atlantic Ocean....