This paper surveys three areas of applications of dynamic games: (i) transboundary pollution, (ii) exploitation of transboundary resources, and (iii) problems of the developing world: capital flights, foreign aid, war and peace. A refresher section introduces the basic ideas and solution...

This paper considers the welfare and policy implications of a merger between environment firms (i.e., firms managing environmental resources or supplying pollution abatement goods and services). The traditional analysis of mergers in Cournot oligopolies is extended in two ways. First, we show...

We construct a model of strategic environmental policy with flexible regulation in an international duopoly context. Firms can affect future environmental regulation through a prior investment in abatement. We demonstrate that the strategic use of environmental policy leads to lower welfare and...

This paper reports the implications of the current state of the art on the science of strategic behavior for the national treatment of different kinds of international environmental public good. While many environmental public goods are managed through multilateral environmental agreements aimed...

We examine numerous settings in which large strategic nations make environmental policies in the presence of international trade and form coalitions that aim to mitigate global or continental transnational pollution. We show that every nation has incentives to internalize all emission...

This paper investigates the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. It explores the impacts of different economic incentives, of a stochastic environment and of varying individual preferences on players' strategies and...

We analyze a vertically differentiated market, assuming that <italic>conventional</italic> and <italic>green</italic> firms' products have different impacts on the environment. Heterogeneous consumers choose to be supplied by a conventional or a green firm, depending on their extra willingness to pay for a green product and the...

Game-theoretic models of fisheries typically consider cases where some players harvest a single common fish stock. However, these types of models do not capture many real-world mixed fisheries, where species can be biologically independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where...

Regulators are sometimes prevented from setting standards on a firm-by-firmbasis. Such restrictions seem inefficient, and rationales for their prevalance have been in terms of politics or fairness. While the requirement that regulation be uniform does not allow the agency to commit to future...

Both developing and developed countries constantly face problems related to ill-defined property rights in common-pool resource systems. These problems are especially acute in water resource ecosystems. Anatural consequence of incomplete property rights is the substitution of market-determined...