Private politics are often introduced by market participants in the absence of public regulation. But when is private politics enough, efficient, or better than administratively costly public regulation? We present a novel framework in which we can study the interaction between regulation,...

Many important economic situations can be modelled as dynamic games of incomplete information with strategic complementarities of actions and types. Of special interest is the question of the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which actions are monotonic in types. In this paper, we...

Type structures are a simple device to describe higher-order beliefs. But how can we check whether two types generate the same belief hierarchy? This paper generalizes the concept of a type morphism and shows that one type structure is contained in another if and only if the former can be mapped...

Why do diverse groups outperform homogeneous groups in some settings, but not in others? We show that while diverse groups experience more frictions than homogeneous ones, they are also less conformist. Homogeneous groups minimize the risk of miscoordination, but they may get stuck in an...

We explore when it is optimal for senders to commit to signal structures which induce the receiver to take higher actions when the underlying state is higher and the preferences of the receiver satisfy strategic complementarity conditions. Building on the literature on monotone comparative...

Purpose - This study aims at investigating the value relevance of the European Emission Allowance (EUA) return and volatility on the equity value of the top listed European Power Generation Firms for the three trading phases of the European Emission Trading Scheme.Design/Methodology/Approach -...