I analyze optimal auction design in the presence of linear type-dependent negative externalities. I characterize the properties of the optimal mechanism when externalities are “strongly decreasing” and “increasing” in the agent’s valuation and I discuss its implementation with...

We study the stable standard of behavior in a perfect foresight situation that was introduced by Xue (Econ Theory 11:603–627, <CitationRef CitationID="CR31">1998</CitationRef>). We assume that the inducement relations are invertible and coalition free. We show that the conditions are sufficient for the existence of the nonempty-valued...</citationref>

The study’s two aims are: (a) to investigate whether groups, as compared to individuals, show a different degree of Endowment Effect (EE) during the negotiating of intangible assets, such as leisure time and (b) to gain some insight into the underlying mechanism behind groups’...

This article considers an asymmetric contest with incomplete information. There are two types of players: informed and uninformed. Each player has a different ability to translate effort into performance in terms of the contest success function. While one player’s type is known to both...

On average, “young” people underestimate whereas “old” people overestimate their chances to survive into the future. Such subjective survival beliefs violate the rational expectations paradigm and are also not in line with models of rational Bayesian learning. In order to explain these...

This paper axiomatizes a recursive utility model that captures both intertemporal utility smoothing defined across time and ambiguity aversion defined over states. The resulting representation adapts Wakai (Econometrica 76:137–153, <CitationRef CitationID="CR18">2008</CitationRef>) model of intertemporal utility smoothing as an...</citationref>

The paper studies the impact of informational ambiguity on behalf of informed traders on history-dependent price behaviour in a model of sequential trading in financial markets. Following Chateauneuf et al. (J Econ Theory 137:538–567, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2008</CitationRef>), we use neo-additive capacities to model ambiguity....</citationref>

This article analyzes the conditions under which any change in a multiplicative background risk induces a more cautious behavior. We give necessary and sufficient conditions under which any change in the multiplicative background risk with respect to the Nth-degree stochastic dominance raises...

This paper merges the non-expected utility approach (Tversky and Kahneman, J Risk Uncertain 5:297–323, <CitationRef CitationID="CR17">1992</CitationRef> and Quiggin, J Econ Behav Organ 3:323–343, <CitationRef CitationID="CR14">1982</CitationRef>) into Akerlof’s (Quart J Econ 84:488–500, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1970</CitationRef>) model of Market for Lemons. We derive the results for different probability...</citationref></citationref></citationref>

We propose and axiomatically analyze a class of rational solutions to simple allocation problems where a policy-maker allocates an endowment <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$E$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> among <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> agents described by a characteristic vector c. We propose a class of recursive rules which mimic a decision process where the...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation>