This paper studies the influence of agency conflicts on the irreversibility effect. Using a dynamic variant of the static Baron and Myerson (Econometrica 50(4):911–930, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">1982</CitationRef>) adverse selection model, we characterize under which circumstances the irreversibility effect arises in the presence...</citationref>

This article presents a characterization of higher-order risk preferences such as prudence or temperance in terms of statistical moments. Our results, which are generalizations of Roger (Theory Decis, 70(1):27–44, <CitationRef CitationID="CR4">2011</CitationRef>) and Ekern (Econ Lett, 6(4), 329–333, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">1980</CitationRef>), give a better understanding...</citationref></citationref>

Various experimental procedures aimed at measuring individual risk aversion involve a list of pairs of alternative prospects. We first study the widely used method by Holt and Laury (Am Econ Rev 92(5):1644–1655, <CitationRef CitationID="CR21">2002</CitationRef>), for which we find that the removal of some items from the lists yields a...</citationref>

Since the seminal paper of Nash (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 36:48–49, <CitationRef CitationID="CR12">1950</CitationRef>) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. In a recent paper of Pruzhansky (Int J Game Theory 40:351–365, <CitationRef CitationID="CR17">2011</CitationRef>) it was shown that under fairy general conditions...</citationref></citationref>

This article addresses major arguments in the controversy about the “rationality” of moral behavior: can moral behavior be explained by rational choice theory (RCT)? The two positions discussed are the incentives thesis (norms are incentives as any other costs and benefits) and the autonomy...

The paper reports experimental data on the behavior in the first-price sealed-bid auction for a varying number of bidders when values and bids are private information. This feedback-free design is proposed for the experimental test of the one-shot game situation. We consider both within-subjects...

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model, the sender can communicate...

There has recently been some literature on the properties of a Health-Related Social Welfare Function (HRSWF). The aim of this article is to contribute to the analysis of the different properties of a HRSWF, paying particular attention to the monotonicity principle. For monotonicity to be...