Aumann and Serrano (J Political Econ 116(5):810–836, <CitationRef CitationID="CR3">2008</CitationRef>) introduce the axiom of duality, which ensures that risk measures respect comparative risk aversion. This paper characterizes all dual risk measures by a simple equivalent condition. This equivalence provides a decomposition result and...</citationref>

Nakata (Theory Decis 71:559–574, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">2011</CitationRef>) presents a model of acquisition of information where the agent does not know what pieces of information she is missing. In this note, we point out some technical problems in a few of Nakata’s results and show how to correct them. Copyright Springer...</citationref>

For any TU game and any ranking of players, the set of all preimputations compatible with the ranking, equipped with the Lorenz order, is a bounded join semi-lattice. Furthermore, the set admits as sublattice the S-Lorenz core intersected with the region compatible with the ranking. This result...

Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates due to their idiosyncratic concerns for the various qualities of the candidates. Our ranking mechanism asks all evaluators to submit individual bids assigning a monetary amount for each possible rank order. The rules...

Many theories of fairness distinguish between compensation factors (‘luck’) and responsibility factors (‘effort’). Whereas the distinction between both types of factors is a matter of definition in theory, empirical work usually requires a sharp cut. All determinants of the outcome of...

Cultural comparisons enjoy increasing popularity in economics. Since cultural comparison must abandon random allocation to treatments, it is unclear whether differences found between countries can be attributed to country characteristics or are merely driven by differences in subject pools. In...

As a stress test of experimenter demand effects, we run an experiment where subjects can physically destroy coupons awarded to them. About one subject out of three does. Giving money back to the experimenter is possible in a separate task but is more consistent with an experimenter demand effect...

By focusing on players’ relative contributions, we study some properties for values in positive cooperative games with transferable utilities. The well-known properties of symmetry (also known as “equal treatment of equals”) and marginality are based on players’ marginal contributions to...

Game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash and Bayesian equilibrium start from an assumption that the players’ sets of possible payoffs, measured in units of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility, are common knowledge, and they go on to define rational behavior in terms of equilibrium strategy...

In a controlled laboratory experiment we use one sample of college students and one of mature executives to investigate how positive skew influences risky choices. In reduced-form regressions we find that both students and executives make riskier choices when lotteries display positive skew. We...