This paper tests whether individual perceptions of markets as good or bad for a public good is correlated with the propensity to report gaps in willingness to pay and willingness to accept revealed within an incentive compatible mechanism. Identifying people based on a notion of market affinity,...

We survey the literature that has explored the implications of decision-making under ambiguity for financial market outcomes, such as portfolio choice and equilibrium asset prices. This ambiguity literature has led to a number of significant advances in our ability to rationalize empirical...

Amartya Sen has developed the so-called capability approach to meet the criticism that income alone may be insufficient as a measure of economic inequality. This is because knowledge about people’s income does not tell us what they are able to acquire with that income. For example, people with...

In this article, we elicit both individuals’ and couples’ preferences assuming prospect theory (PT) as a general theoretical framework for decision under risk. Our experimental method, based on certainty equivalents, allows to infer measurements of utility and probability weighting at the...

Most of the existing literature on social preferences either tests whether certain characteristics of the social context (like intentions of others) influence individual decisions, or tries to estimate parameters of social preference functions describing such behavior at the level of the entire...

We reassess the possibility of full information pooling in a Condorcet jury environment featuring heterogeneous and privately known preference types. We find that in general, with uncorrelated preference types, only very limited heterogeneity is compatible with full pooling. We provide a...

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis–Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced...

The article shows that strategic quantity competition can be characterized by behavioral heterogeneity, once competing firms are allowed in a pre-market stage to optimally choose the behavioral rule they will follow in their strategic choice of quantities. In particular, partitions of the...

Under approval voting, each voter can nominate as many candidates as she wishes and the election winners are those candidates that are nominated most often. A voter is said to have voted sincerely if she prefers all those candidates she nominated to all other candidates. As there can be a set of...

We study a best-of-two contest with two homogeneous players (teams). The winner is the player who wins in both stages. In the case of one victory for each team, a draw determines the identity of the winner. Each team has a value of winning the contest as well as a value of winning a single game....