Under asymmetric information, entry-deterring strategies by an incumbent monopolist can consist of deviations from its static monopoly price through downward deviations termed downward limit pricing, or upward deviations termed upward limit pricing. Our analysis shows that the mode of post-entry...

We consider a single indivisible object auctioned in an ascending bid English auction. Two variations of this auction are compared with respect to the seller's revenue. In the first mechanism the participants observe the identity of a bidder that drops from the auction while in the second...

This paper examines incentives for information disclosure in a oligopolistic market when buyers are unsure of the existence of that information. Previous empirical and theoretical work has shown that mandatory disclosure laws can be binding when buyers do not know whether the information exists....

When evaluating the rationality of a player in a game one has to examine counterfactuals such as "what would happen if the player were to do what he does not do?" In this paper I develop a model of a normal form game where counterfactuals of this sort are evaluated as in the philosophical...

A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. We find, however, that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structure....

We propose a new theory of choice between lotteries, which combines an 'economic' view of decision making - based on a rational, though incomplete, ordering - with a 'psychological' view - based on heuristics. This theory can explain observed violations of EU theory, namely all cyclical patterns...

In this paper we try to explain how price discrimination can cause bilateral trade patterns of the type seen under countertrade agreements. We interpret countertrade as a form of transaction bundling, which can discriminate between potential trading partners, and we combine characteristics from...