This paper verifies the robustness of Dixit's claim that common agency problems in the public sector can be solved by restrictions on the incentive schemes that government agencies can develop for the subordinates of other departments. In our model, the outside principal (for instance, an...

Previous studies of transport tax reform have typically assumed that the reform itself does not affect the marginal value of time. In this paper we consider a model of urban transport with two trip purposes, commuting and non-commuting, to analyse the effects of transport tax reform on the value...

In this paper we show how cost-benefit analysis can be used as a decision support mechanism for the location of new (urban) forest land, starting from the multifunctional role of these new forests. We start with a simple presentation of the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) technique. Key features of...

This paper uses a formal model to examine the welfare gains from a marginal increase in the price of on-street parking. The benefits of such a policy are shown to depend on the improvement in search externalities in the on-street parking market itself, plus effects on other distorted urban...

We consider a congestible static traffic network which is used by different households and analyse the conditions for optimal congestion taxes on network links, when not all links in the network can be taxed (partial network pricing). This is done under two assumptions about the toll revenues....

I consider an urban transport system in which passenger cars and buses are used for commuting trips and for leisure trips, where both transport modes contribute to congestion, and where commuting is a strict complement to taxable labour supply. The optimal tax structure for raising a given...

This paper extends a previous analysis by Franckx (2001). We consider an inspection game between n polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in, on the one hand, imposing the maximal...

We consider the determination of the optimal fine for noncompliance by a legislator who anticipates the inspection game between an autonomous inspection agency and polluting firms. This agency can make the inspection of individual firms contingent on ambient pollution. The agency's autonomy...