Regressions and tests performed on data from Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2004 survey show that personal or household experience of bribery is not a good predictor of perceptions held about corruption among the general population. In contrast, perceptions about...

Regressions and tests performed on data from Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2004 survey show that personal or household experience of bribery is not a good predictor of perceptions held about corruption among the general population. In contrast, perceptions about...

Regressions and tests performed on data from Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004 survey show that personal or household experience of bribery is not a good predictor of perceptions held about corruption among the general population. In contrast, perceptions about the...

In environments where regulations are lax and controls function badly, cleanly participating in tenders is irrational. An increase in one single firm’s propensity to bribe induces the same behaviour upon the others (“bad apple effect”), and the likelihood of firms to bribe tends to...

This note examines the Integrity Pact (IP) methodology proposed by Transparency International to confront the problem of corruption in public procurement. The examination draws from a decision model for participants developed elsewhere, in which the critical elements are shown to be the...

The prisoner’s dilemma is sometimes invoked to describe the situation facing participants in tenders. Reasoning on the basis of the dilemma metaphor, it is contended that agreeing not to bribe public officials in order to win contracts (collaboration) leads to better outcomes than bribing...