A principal hires an agent to work on a long-term project that culminates in a breakthrough or a breakdown. At each time, the agent privately chooses to work or shirk. Working increases the arrival rate of breakthroughs and decreases the arrival rate of breakdowns. To motivate the agent to work,...

PART 1. PURPOSE AND PROLOGUE -- Chapter 1. Owning and Owing -- Chapter 2. From Warfare to Welfare in Three Generations -- PART 2. ACCOUNTING FOR GOVERNMENT -- Chapter 3. Why Government Accounting Matters -- Chapter 4. What Does the Government Balance Sheet Look Like? -- Chapter 5. Why Accrual...

We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize optimal persuasion in this baseline regime and in an...

We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize optimal persuasion in this baseline regime and in an...

We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in a mechanism design setting. The principal verifies the agent's claims with statistical tests. The agent's probability of passing each test depends on his type. In our framework, the revelation principle holds. We characterize whether each...

I study the provision of information as an incentive instrument in a continuous-time sender-receiver model. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and sends signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses public actions which affect the welfare of both players. I solve for...