The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out self-fulfilling expectations. We show that, in a large class of static...

Stablecoins are crypto-assets that aim to maintain a stable value relative to a fiat currency. This paper documents one implication of their massive growth since 2020 for the financing of the real economy. The largest stablecoins manage their peg with the US dollar by holding short-term safe...

The conditions that ensure the existence of a unique stable equilibrium – determinacy conditions - for rational expectations models with Markov switching depend on the stability concept, contrasting with standard linear rational expectations models. In this paper, we offer a unified framework...

The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out undesired self-fulfilling expectations. We first show that, in a large class of...

We investigate conditions under which a government facing a large set of small private agents can implement its desired outcome when it has only a limited commitment ability to policy actions. We show that, in static contexts, more commitment ability always improves equilibrium outcomes and, in...

The last review of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy in 2003 followed a period of predominantly upside risks to price stability. Experience following the 2008 financial crisis has focused renewed attention on the question of how monetary and fiscal policy should best interact, in particular...