Players have consonant interests if each has a strategy favourable to the pursuit of his own and the interests of the others when the latter adopt a best response. Reasonableness is to move according to such a strategy at the stage reached, reaping the gains this generates. Some overt games hide...

The paper outlines in an informal an summary way some perspectives suggested by game theory for analysing the problem of the acquisition and use of force, the shift in its use from coercion to the power to enforce rules, the recognition of abilities and entrepreneurship as sources of power more...

Not all the coordination of decisions observed in real economies is produced by the market; a substantial part is the result, on the one side, of agreements and contracts, on the other, of social rules supported by punishments ministered by individuals but in name of the community. Both...

A standard Ricardian model is completed with the introduction of a market for land. If the economy were endowed with enough future markets, it would have no equilibria. The economy does however admit temporary equilibria of two types. The first uses equilibrium expectations; full employment...

Competition, hopefully perfect, both among agents and among countries, has become the ideal in recent years. In equilibrium, it maximizes the gains from specialization and division of labour and leads to Pareto efficiency. But one knows stability to be a problem; furthermore, most markets are...

It gives an informal definition of the main elements of a game: the set of players, the concept of a move and of a strategy, the normal and the extended form, a first introduction to the description of information, the set of results that can be reached and the value each player attaches to a...

A simple proof of existence of a non cooperative Nash equilibrium is briefly discussed, together with an introduction to the problems arising from its uniqueness or non uniqueness, to the properties which can be ascribed to an equilibrium and those connected with the search for an equilibrium.

The concept of a repeated game is introduced and applied to the case of the centipede, the finite and the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. The consequences of the assumption of common knowledge of rationality are outlined. A concept of reasonableness is introduced and some of its...

After introducing the binary relation of domination and its properties, one defines the concept of non dominated strategies and some conditions for their existence, the concept of solution of a game, that of rationalizability, that of best reply and the concept of non cooperative Nash equilibrium.