In Bayesian games the strategic outcome of a game might be sensitive to the higher order beliefs of the players. Robust strategic behavior around a perfect information type requires high enough common belief in the true state of the world. We ask whether players in a private observations...

This paper analyses the optimal timing of switching between alternative and consecutive regimes in optimal growth models. We derive the appropriate necessary conditions for such problems by means of the standard techniques from calculus of variations and some basic properties of Sobolev spaces.

This paper analyses the optimal timing of switching between alternative and consecutive regimes in optimal growth models. We derive the appropriate necessary conditions for such problems by means of the standard techniques from calculus of variations and some basic properties of Sobolev spaces.

This paper analyses the optimal timing of switching between alternative and consecutive regimes in optimal growth models. We derive the appropriate necessary conditions for such problems by means of the standard techniques from calculus of variations and some basic properties of Sobolev spaces.

This paper analyses the optimal timing of switching between alternative and consecutive regimes in optimal growth models. We derive the appropriate necessary conditions for such problems by means of standard techniques from the calculus of variations and some basic properties of Sobolev spaces.

This paper annalyses the optimal timing of switching between alternative and consecutive regimes on optimal growth models. We derive the appropriate necessary conditions for such problems by means of the standard techniques from calculus of variations and some basic properties of Sobolev spaces.