Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. In this context, we first investigate the extent to which collusive...

In bargainings, the parties’ bargaining powers (BPs) may determine not only how the surplus is shared (share effect), but also the size of the aggregate surplus (size effect). Since the size effect may be positive or negative, the sign of the effect on a party’s payoff of a change in her BP...

This paper considers a vertically related industry where an upstream supplier simultaneously negotiates with two downstream retailers endowed with (possibly) asymmetric bargaining powers, over the purchase of an input. Downstream firms have asymmetric capacities and downstream competition has a...

Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. In this context, we first investigate the extent to which collusive...

Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. In this context, we first investigate the extent to which collusive...