Feld, Grofman and Ray (2003) offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and the kernel. They look for a set of weights that preserves winning coalitions that has the property of minimizing the difference between the weight of the smallest and the...

For a given distribution of voter ideal points, candidates may compete, not only by changing their policy platforms, but also by seeking to persuade voters to place more weight on one of the given dimensions. We do not examine persuasion mechanisms, per se, but, rather, investigate how change of...

The Banks set (1(4):295–306, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1985</CitationRef>) is one of the more important concepts in voting theory since it tells us about the sophisticated outcomes of standard amendment voting procedures commonly in use throughout the English speaking world (and elsewhere as well). While the properties of the Banks...</citationref>