Do investors correctly price extreme events that they have never seen occur? To shed light on this question, I examine market responses to the risk of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I find evidence that investors indeed priced firms’ exposures to nuclear destruction: Firms...

Do investors correctly price extreme events that they have never seen occur? To shed light on this question, I examine market responses to the risk of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I find evidence that investors indeed priced firms' exposures to nuclear destruction: Firms...

Do investors correctly price extreme events that they have never seen occur? To shed light on this question, I examine market responses to the risk of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I find evidence that investors indeed priced firms' exposures to nuclear destruction: Firms...

We introduce taxi ridership between the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and large financialinstitutions with major presences in New York City as a proxy for Fed activity. Amarket-timing strategy that buys the market portfolio (risk-free asset) when lagged Fed-bankridership is low (high) earns a...

How do markets learn about central banks? Employing narrative evidence and futures data, Cieślak, Morse and Vissing-Jørgensen (2018) argue that private, informal channels systematically carry Federal Reserve information to markets around monetary-policy meetings. I complement their work with...

In this paper, I employ anonymous New York City yellow taxi records to infer variation in interactions between insiders of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New York Fed) and insiders of major commercial banks around Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. Taxi rides between the...