Search Results - person:"Gildea, John"

The biases of Federal Reserve bank presidents

Havrilesky, Thomas M. - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 33 (1995) 2, pp. 274-284

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001179376

The regional representation of federal reserve bank presidents

Gildea, John A. - In: Journal of money, credit and banking : JMCB 24 (1992) 2, pp. 215-225

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001126008

Reliable and unreliable partisan appointees to the Board of Governors

Havrilesky, Thomas M. - In: Public choice 73 (1992) 4, pp. 397-417

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001126032

Screening FOMC members for their biases and dependability

Havrilesky, Thomas M. - In: Economics & politics 3 (1991) 2, pp. 139-149

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001106775

The Biases of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents

Havrilesky, Thomas; Gildea, John - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 33 (1995) 2, pp. 274-284

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006333796

The Biases of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents.

Havrilesky, Thomas; Gildea, John - In: Economic Inquiry 33 (1995) 2, pp. 274-84

This paper develops statistical tests that show that, in Federal Open Market Committee voting, Federal Reserve bank presidents, as a group, prefer less expansionary monetary policy than Federal Reserve board members. Further tests show that a subset of Federal Reserve bank presidents vote in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005449886

Congress Threatens the Fed

Havrilesky, Thomas; Chappell, Henry; Gildea, John; … - In: Challenge : the magazine of economic affairs 36 (1993) 2, pp. 50-57

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006106360

The Regional Representation of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents.

Gildea, John A - In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 24 (1992) 2, pp. 215-25

Recent litigation has questioned the constitutionality of having Federal Reserve Bank presidents serve on the Federal Open Market Committee. Inherent, but undocumented, in these lawsuits is the belief that district bank presidents vote differently than Federal Reserve Governors at Federal Open...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005227489

Reliable and Unreliable Partisan Appointees to the Board of Governors.

Havrilesky, Thomas; Gildea, John A - In: Public Choice 73 (1992) 4, pp. 397-417

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005674735

The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes.

Havrilesky, Thomas; Gildea, John A - In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 23 (1991) 1, pp. 130-38

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005736603