We introduce a simple agent-based model which allows us to analyze three stylized facts: a fat-tailed size distribution of companies, a `tent-shaped' growth rate distribution, the scaling relation of the growth rate variance with firm size, and the causality between them. This is achieved under...

We present a macroeconomic agent-based model that combines several mechanisms operating at the same timescale, while remaining mathematically tractable. It comprises enterprises and workers who compete in a job market and a commodity goods market. The model is stock-flow consistent; a bank lends...

Whenever customers' choices (e.g. to buy or not a given good) depend on others choices (cases coined 'positive externalities' or 'bandwagon effect' in the economic literature), the demand may be multiply valued: for a same posted price, there is either a small number of buyers, or a large one --...

Basic evidences on non-profit making and other forms of benevolent-based organizations reveal a rough partition of members between somepure consumers of the public good (free-riders) and benevolent individuals (cooperators). We study the relationship between the community size and the level of...

We introduce a simple agent-based model which allows us to analyze three stylized facts: a fat-tailed size distribution of companies, a ‘tent-shaped’ growth rate distribution, the scaling relation of the growth rate variance with firm size, and the causality between them. This is achieved...

We consider a model of socially interacting individuals that make a binary choice in a context of positive additive endogenous externalities. It encompasses as particular cases several models from the sociology and economics literature. We extend previous results to the case of a general...

We explore the effects of social influence in a simple market model in which a large number of agents face a binary choice: 'to buy/not to buy' a single unit of a product at a price posted by a single seller (the monopoly case). We consider the case of 'positive externalities': an agent is more...