This paper examines how companies respond to negative ESG incidents by appointing directors with experience in charitable organizations. We find that firms are more likely to make such appointments following ESG incidents, especially when these incidents attract substantial media attention or...

We develop a dynamic equilibrium model to derive the endogenous relations among firms' ownership structures, managerial incentives and asset returns. Ownership concentration is positively related to managerial incentives (PPS), but is negatively related to its expected stock (dollar) return and...

We develop a market equilibrium model to show how search frictions in the CEO market, agency conflicts and product market characteristics interact to affect CEO market tightness, firm size and CEO incentive pay. The theory generates novel implications that link firms' product markets with CEO...

We study a continuous-time dynamic capital structure model in which a firm can continuously adjust its capital structure. Unlike previous models, we assume heterogeneous equity and debt holders and segmented equity and debt markets. We show that the expected future equity and debt market...

We develop a dynamic equilibrium model to derive testable time-series and cross-sectional implications for the endogenous relations among ownership concentration, managerial incentives, and asset prices. For a given firm at any date, ownership concentration is positively related to managerial...

We show how product market competition affects capital structure by developing a tractable model that embeds the tradeoff between the tax benefits and bankruptcy costs of debt in an industry equilibrium setting with heterogeneous, imperfectly competitive firms. Different determinants of...

CEOs are paid more if they outperform other firms in their blockholders' portfolios. For every percentage point by which their own firm's return exceeds the return of the largest blockholder's basket of investments in a year, their compensation increases by over $9,800. Once we benchmark to this...

As is well-known, firms' innovative efforts can benefit from information about past implementations of similar technologies by other firms ("technological knowledge"). In this paper, we examine the effect of technological knowledge on agency problems. We present robust evidence that...