We report on an experiment in which subjects older than 55 years old and subjects younger than 26 years old play repeatedly 4 versions of the centipede game. For each game we define four treatments that allow us to study cooperation and belief formation of these two age groups. We find that...

Using an intergenerational trilateral laboratory gift-exchange game, we investigate how employers' own performance in a real effort task impacts on the wage setting behavior of younger and older employers. We find that the employers' own past performance strongly affects wage setting behavior,...

Using an intergenerational trilateral laboratory gift-exchange game, we investigate how employers' own performance in a real effort task impacts on the wage setting behavior of younger and older employers. We find that the employers' own past performance strongly affects wage setting behavior,...

Using an intergenerational trilateral laboratory gift-exchange game, we investigate how employers' own performance in a real effort task impacts on the wage setting behavior of younger and older employers. We find that the employers' own past performance strongly affects wage setting behavior,...

We report on an experiment in which subjects older than 55 years old and subjects younger than 26 years old play repeatedly 4 versions of the centipede game. For each game we define four treatments that allow us to study cooperation and belief formation of these two age groups. We find that...

To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to...