Strong network effects generate multiple tipping equilibria, in which firms compete for the adoption of all consumers rather than the marginal consumer. In this scenario, a quality distortion—the Spence distortion—should be absent; this contradicts the well-established Spence distortion...

This paper studies a large class of multi-agent contracting models with the property that agents' payoffs constitute a weighted potential game. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents' strategic interactions. I fully characterize a contracting scheme that is optimal to the principal for a large...

Strong network effects typically lead to multiple equilibria in two-sided markets. To overcome the methodological challenge of selecting an appropriate equilibrium, this paper shows that many two-sided market models are weighted potential games, and thus potential maximization, a refinement of...

The use of incentive packages has intensified as local governments compete for new plants and corporate relocations, and as private firms increasingly demand a deal. While incentives promise jobs and tax revenue, scholars and practitioners criticize their high cost and limited accountability....

The occupational structure of an establishment provides a description of its production process by detailing the distribution and relative intensity of tasks performed. In this paper, I investigate whether there are substantive differences in the occupational structures of low- and high-wage...

The use of incentive packages has intensified as local governments compete for new plants and corporate relocations, and as private firms increasingly demand a deal. While incentives promise jobs and tax revenue, scholars and practitioners criticize their high cost and limited accountability....

The use of incentive packages has intensified as local governments compete for new plants and corporate relocations, and as private firms increasingly demand a deal. While incentives promise jobs and tax revenue, scholars and practitioners criticize their high cost and limited accountability....