We propose a new explanation of the endowment effect. The value of exchanged goods is uncertain. Specifically, the value is assumed to be ambiguous, represented by a set of probability distributions over possible values. Ambiguity averse agents (maxmin expected utility maximisers) set WTA and...

We develop a formal model of social duties. Duties to respect entitlements (duties of justice) differ from duties to promote well-being (duties of charity). A situationspecific version of our model takes entitlements as primitives. A fully portable version derives entitlements from situational...

We study learning in a decentralized pairwise adverse selection economy, where buyers have access to the quality of traded goods but not to the quality of non- traded goods. Buyers categorize ask prices in order to predict quality as a function of ask price. The categorization is endogenously...

We experimentally explore the role of collective incentives in sustaining cooperation in finitely repeated public goods games with imperfect monitoring. In our experiment players only observe noisy signals about individual contributions, while total output is perfectly observed. We consider...

We develop a formal theory of decency. Shared values and understandings give rise to social norms. Norms may mandate collectively optimal behavior, but they need not do so. Furthermore, behavior can be affected by social values even if it stops short of norm compliance. Seeking stronger...

We develop a formal model of social duties. Duties to respect entitlements (duties of justice) differ from duties to promote well-being (duties of charity). A situationspecific version of our model takes entitlements as primitives. A fully portable version derives entitlements from situational...