This study establishes that a uniform-price mechanism is superior to a discriminatory-price mechanism for preventing momentum ignition price manipulation (MIPM). I consider a model in which a single speculator trades with multiple dealers. They can make a profit by exploiting "momentum''...

This study proposes a new selection mechanism to identify the efficient allocation of a deposit contract model by using agents' preference for honesty. The main result is that the efficient allocation is uniquely implementable through iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, while...

This study considers how to implement an efficient allocation of a financial intermediation model, including liquidation costs. The main result shows that there is a mechanism such that, for any liquidation cost, an efficient allocation is implementable in strictly dominant strategies. There is...

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for two-person ex post implementation of a social choice set in a general environment. A single social choice function is ex post implementable if it satisfies ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity no veto (EMNV) conditions....

This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and...