Most assets are traded in multiple interconnected trading venues. This paper develops an equilibrium model of decentralized markets that accommodates general market structures with coexisting exchanges. Decentralized markets can allocate risk among traders with different risk preferences more...

When selling goods like wireless spectrum or electricity contracts, auction designers often opt for core-selecting mechanisms -- i.e., auctions that induce outcomes in the core -- in order to balance revenue and efficiency goals. But increasingly, auctions -- such as the FCC's 2016-17 Incentive...

Futures contracts have been highly successful financial securities, with substantial trading volumes and active underlying asset markets. In a dynamic market framework, we show that imperfect competition in future spot markets motivates trades in futures contracts in earlier periods. The...

Advances in market-clearing technology for multiple assets and synthetic products present alternative ways to leverage complementarities and substitutabilites in asset payoffs. This paper compares their equilibrium and welfare effects. Our results underscore the difference the price impact makes...

The literature has shown that complementarity places significant structure on outcomes in matching environments, games, and exchange economies. We examine the extent to which this structure, and the economic intuition underlying it, is common across these classes of environments. We show that...

Availability of information to market participants is often seen as essential to the functioning of markets. We consider a market-design based alternative to improve access to information. We examine designs allowing traders to condition their demands on simultaneously-determined prices in...