We analyze Stackelberg leadership in a first-price auction. Leadership is induced by an information system, represented by a spy, that leaks one bidder's bid before others choose their bids. However, the leader may secretly revise his bid with some probability; therefore, the leaked bid is only...

A number of shortcomings in Germany’s efforts to contain the spread of the coronavirus, including fraudulent testing, vaccination fraud and insufficient testing capacity have been identified and need to be remedied before another wave or worse, another pandemic. This paper examines the...

Millions of citizens and firms lack access to high speed internet, even though gov- ernments pledged to spend huge sums of money to subsidize internet networks. In this paper we review some systematic flaws of present policies and outline a promising alternative. We propose that governments...

We analyze spying out a rival’s price in a general duopoly model with differentiated prod- ucts where payoff functions are strictly supermodular and firms are subject to incomplete information about costs. Spying has two effects: it induces a sequential game and eliminates the spying firm’s...

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...

Millions of citizens and firms lack access to high speed internet, even though governmentspledged to spend huge sums of money to subsidize internet networks. In this paper we reviewsome systematic flaws of present subsidy policies and outline a promising alternative. We proposethat governments...