Based on an analysis of the agency risk for bondholders from managerial entrenchment and fraud, and using an efficient contracting framework, we derive and test refutable hypotheses about the influence of managerial moral hazard on the use of bond covenants. Entrenched managers can both...

Based on an analysis of the agency risk for bondholders from managerial entrenchment and fraud, and using an efficient contracting framework, we derive and test refutable hypotheses about the influence of managerial moral hazard on the use of bond covenants. Entrenched managers can both...

This article examines underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned offerings in the corporate bond market. We investigate whether underpricing represents a solution to an information problem or a liquidity problem. We find that underpricing occurs with both IPOs and seasoned...

Based on an analysis of the agency risk for bondholders from managerial entrenchment and fraud, we derive and test refutable hypotheses about the influence of managerial agency risk on bond covenants, using a comprehensive database of corporate bonds from 1993-2007. Managerial entrenchment and...

This paper examines underpricing of IPOs and seasoned offerings in the corporate bond market. We investigate whether underpricing represents a solution to an information problem or a liquidity problem. We find that underpricing occurs with both IPOs and seasoned offering and is highest among...

This paper examines underpricing of IPOs and seasoned offerings in the corporate bond market. We investigate whether underpricing represents a solution to an information problem or a liquidity problem. We find that underpricing occurs with both IPOs and seasoned offering and is highest among...