In this paper we characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of a location-then-price game where firms first choose locations and after that compete for prices in two subsequent periods. Locations are thus seen as long term commitments. There are two types of consumers, each with different...

In this paper, we study a two-stage location-then-price game where consumers are distributed piecewise uniformly, each piece being referred to as an interval.Although the firms face a coordination problem, it is obvious that, for any given locations and prices, there is a unique indifferent...

In this paper, we analyze a variant of the standard Hotelling model of spatial competition where firms first choose locations along the line and then, given these locations, compete in prices.Consumers have a finite reservation price and incur a quadratic transportation cost.We show that there...

Models of spatial competition are designed and analyzed to describe the fact that space, by its very nature, is a source of market power. This field of research, lying at the interface of game theory and economics, has attracted much interest because location problems are related to many aspects...

In this paper we present a generalization of the circular model. In this model there are two concentric circular markets, which enables us to study two types of markets simultaneously. There are switching costs involved for moving from one circle to the other circle, which can also be thought of...