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  • Search: person:"Wolinsky, A."
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Year of publication
Subject
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AUCTIONS 2 EFFICIENCY 2 RATIONALIZATION 2 GAME THEORY 1 INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1 demand 1 econometrics 1 economic models 1 incentives 1 mergers 1 monopolies 1
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Online availability
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Free 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 7
Language
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Undetermined 7
Author
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Wolinsky, A. 6 Dekel, E. 2 Bagwell, K. 1 HORN, H. 1 Pesendorfer, W. 1 Rubinstein, A. 1 Rustichini, A. 1 WOLINSKY, A. 1
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Institution
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Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas School of Economics 2 Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain 1 David K. Levine 1 Department of Economics, Princeton University 1 Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences 1 Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), Stockholms Universitet 1
Published in...
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Tel Aviv 2 Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences 1 Levine's Working Paper Archive 1 Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain 1 Princeton Economic Theory Papers 1 Stockholm - International Economic Studies 1
Source
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RePEc 7
Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Did you mean: person:"polinsky, A." (363 results)
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Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability.
Rubinstein, A.; Wolinsky, A. - David K. Levine - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008765414
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Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions.
Dekel, E.; Wolinsky, A. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 2000
We consider discrete versions of independent, private-value, first-price auctions. We show for any fixed finite set of possible bids, if the number of participants is large enough, then the set of rationalizable bids involves all players bidding the highest bid that is lower than their private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783626
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Cover Image
Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions.
Dekel, E.; Wolinsky, A. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 2000
We consider discrete versions of independent, private-value, first-price auctions. We show for any fixed finite set of possible bids, if the number of participants is large enough, then the set of rationalizable bids involves all players bidding the highest bid that is lower than their private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783650
Saved in:
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Game Theory and Industrial Organization.
Bagwell, K.; Wolinsky, A. - Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences - 2000
In this article, we consider how important developments in game theory have contributed to the theory of industrial organization.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005162768
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Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice
Pesendorfer, W.; Wolinsky, A. - Department of Economics, Princeton University - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005794803
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Learning about Variable Demand in the Long Run.
Rustichini, A.; Wolinsky, A. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669297
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BILATERAL MONOPOLIES AND INCENTIVES FOR MERGER
HORN, H.; WOLINSKY, A. - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), … - 1988
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779994
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