This paper studies the optimal design of a liability-sharing arrangement as an infinitely repeated game. We construct a noncooperative model with two agents: one active and one passive. The active agent can take a costly and unobservable action to reduce the incidence of crisis, but a crisis is...

Land finance is a special land financing mode in China under the nationalization of urban land since 1954. The policy authorizes local governments to collect fiscal revenue from land grant premiums and land taxes. As China is experiencing the social and economic transformation, heavily replying...

This paper studies the optimal design of a liability sharing arrangement as an infinitely repeated game. We construct a schematic, non-cooperative, 2-player model where an active agent can take a costly, unobservable action to try to avert a crisis, and then when a crisis occurs, both agents...

We investigate the efficiency property of a monetary economy with spot trade. We prove a conjecture that is essentially due to Bewley (Models of Monetary Economics (1980); Econometrica 51 (1983), 1485-504). The gist is that monetary spot trading is nearly efficient ex ante in an environment...

We study what features an economic environment might possess, such that it would be Pareto efficient for the exchange of goods in that environment to be conducted on spot markets where those goods trade for money. We prove a conjecture that is essentially due to Bewley [1980, 1983]. Monetary...

This paper shows that one of the defining features of Walrasian equilibrium - law of one price - characterizes equilibrium in a non-Walrasian environment of (1) random trade matching without double coincidence of wants, and (2) strategic, price-setting conduct. Money is modeled as perfectly...