This paper discusses a method for evaluating the competitive effects of reverse payments in the wake of the Supreme Court's Opinion in Actavis. Specifically, we demonstrate a method for evaluating actual reverse payments against a “maximum-efficient-reverse-payment” criterion under both...

Previous studies (e.g. by Peltzman and Mathios-Plummer) reveal powerful share‐value effects of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) actions against firms for their advertising. Curiously, however, Mathios‐Plummer finds that when the FTC announces an investigation but simultaneous settlement of the...

We compare the short-run welfare effects of two types of settlement agreements, quot;reverse paymentsquot; of the brand-name drug makers to generic producers not to enter the market and delayed entry when these payments are restricted both under the entry injunction (imposed by the Hatch-Waxman...

Previous studies (e.g., by Sam Peltzman) reveal powerful share-value effects of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) actions against firms for allegedly false advertising. Curi- ously, however, when the FTC announces an investigation but simultaneous settlement of the case with the advertiser, no...

Previous studies (e.g., by Sam Peltzman) reveal powerful share-value effects of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) actions against firms for allegedly false advertising. Curiously, however, when the FTC announces an investigation but simultaneous settlement of the case with the advertiser, no...