We model endogenous technology adoption and competition among liquidity providers with access to High-Frequency Trading (HFT) technology. HFT technology provides speed and informational advantages. Information advantages may restore excessively toxic markets. Speed technology may reduce resource...

We analyze how costs related to the "plumbing" (i.e., clearing, settlement, and custody) of securities markets affect market quality and welfare. Our model compares two post-trade fee structures for allocating these costs. One charges a uniform fee for all trades, the other, marginal-cost-based...

We analyze the likelihood of arms race behavior in markets with liquidity provision by HFTs. Liquidity providers (makers) and liquidity consumers (takers) make costly investments in monitoring speed. Competition among makers and takers induces arms race behavior. However, trade success...

Merely out of fear for future liquidity shocks, traders may run on financial markets. We show this coordination failure could be overcome by applying circuit breakers (which curb excessive trading). However, the common-practice circuit breakers fall short of their potential and could even damage...

We study the relation between liquidity in financial markets and post-trading fees (i.e. clearing and settlement fees). The clearing and settlement agent (CSD) faces different marginal costs for different types of transactions. Costs are lower for an internalized transaction, i.e. when buyer and...

We study the relation between liquidity in financial markets and post-trading fees (i.e. clearing and settlement fees). The clearing and settlement agent (CSD) faces different marginal costs for different types of transactions. Costs are lower for an internalized transaction, i.e. when buyer and...