We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma with implementation errors, and look at the resulting population dynamics, both analytically and with simulations. We show that with implementation errors, pure equilibrium strategies represented by finite state automata exhibit a structure that we...

Repetition is a classic mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The standard way to study repeated games is to assume that there is an exogenous probability with which every interaction is repeated. If it is sufficiently likely that interactions are repeated, then reciprocity and cooperation...

The main ingredient of this paper is the derivation of the generalized version of Hamilton's rule. This version is derived with the Generalized Price equation. The generalized version of Hamilton's rule generalizes the original rule, in the sense that it produces a set of rules; one rule for...

The main ingredient of this paper is the derivation of the Generalized Price equation. This generalizes the original Price equation in the sense that it produces a set of Price-like equations, one for every different underlying model that one could assume has generated the data. All of these...

Repetition is a classic mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. The standard way to study repeated games is to assume that there is an exogenous probability with which every interaction is repeated. If it is sufficiently likely that interactions are repeated, then reciprocity and cooperation...

The main ingredient of this paper is the derivation of the Generalized Price equation. This generalizes the original Price equation in the sense that it produces a set of Price-like equations, one for every different underlying model that one could assume has generated the data. All of these...

The main ingredient of this paper is the derivation of the generalized version of Hamilton's rule. This version is derived with the Generalized Price equation. The generalized version of Hamilton's rule generalizes the original rule, in the sense that it produces a set of rules; one rule for...

Alger and Weibull (2013) ask the question whether a combination of assortative matching and incomplete information leads to the evolution of moral or altruistic preferences. Their central result states that Homo Hamiltonenis – a type that has moral preferences with a morality parameter equal...

Alger and Weibull (2013) ask the question whether a combination of assortative matching and incomplete information leads to the evolution of moral or altruistic preferences. Their central result states that Homo Hamiltonenis - a type that has moral preferences with a morality parameter equal to...

In this paper we review, upgrade, and synthesize existing models from evolutionary game theory, all of which aim at explaining human behaviour in the ultimatum game. Our new and improved versions of Gale et al. (1995), Nowak et al. (2000), and Rand et al. (2013) avoid shortcomings that the...