EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"\"Almost\" voting rules"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
"Almost" voting rules 4 committee decisions 4 scoring rules 4 Abstimmungsregel 3 Group decision-making 3 Gruppenentscheidung 3 Neue politische Ökonomie 3 Public choice 3 Theorie 3 Theory 3 Voting behaviour 3 Voting rule 3 Wahlverhalten 3 "almost" voting rules 2 Committee decisions 2 Decision 2 Entscheidung 2 Scoring rules 2 India 1 Indien 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 6
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 6
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 6 Arbeitspapier 3 Graue Literatur 3 Non-commercial literature 3
Language
All
English 6
Author
All
Baharad, Eyal 6 Danziger, Leif 6
Published in...
All
CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo working papers 1 Discussion paper series / IZA 1 GLO Discussion Paper 1 GLO discussion paper 1 IZA Discussion Papers 1
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 3 EconStor 3
Showing 1 - 6 of 6
Cover Image
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?
Baharad, Eyal; Danziger, Leif - 2018
We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011794190
Saved in:
Cover Image
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Baharad, Eyal; Danziger, Leif - 2018
We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011796376
Saved in:
Cover Image
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Baharad, Eyal; Danziger, Leif - 2018
We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011816559
Saved in:
Cover Image
Voting in hiring committees : which "almost" rule is optimal?
Baharad, Eyal; Danziger, Leif - 2018
We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almostplurality,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011789019
Saved in:
Cover Image
Voting in hiring committees : which "almost" rule is optimal?
Baharad, Eyal; Danziger, Leif - 2018
We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795205
Saved in:
Cover Image
Voting in hiring committees : which "almost" rule is optimal?
Baharad, Eyal; Danziger, Leif - 2018
We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131234
Saved in:
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...