Search Results - subject:"“too big to fail”"

Risk-taking Incentives, Governance,and Losses in the Financial Crisis

CHESNEY, Marc; STROMBERG, Jacob; WAGNER, Alexander F. - 2010

This paper studies the extent to which risk-taking incentives of CEOs and other governance features in a range of years prior to the recent financial crisis were related to the write-downs of U.S. financial institutions during the crisis. We document that institutions whose CEOs had particularly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008922910

"Too Big to Fail in Financial Crisis: Motives, Countermeasures, and Prospects"

Shull, Bernard - Levy Economics Institute - 2010

2007–09 highlighted a "too big to fail" problem that has existed for decades. As in the past, effects on competition and … understanding of why too-big-to-fail policies have persisted will provide a stronger basis for developing effective reforms. After a … resource." Each of these motives indicates a different type of reform necessary to contain too-big-to-fail policies. They are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008587743

INTERNALIZING OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS COSTS

Dinga, Emil - In: Studii Financiare (Financial Studies) 14 (2010) 3, pp. 114-118

crisis of August 2007. The main emphasis is on conceptual and impact assessment of the principle of "too big to fail …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008764569

Too Big to Fail: A Misguided Policy in Times of Financial Turmoil

Goodlet, Clyde - In: C.D. Howe Institute Commentary (2010) 311

are often characterized as a Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) policy. Proponents of such a policy argue that preventing the failure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008680603

Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive

Admati, Anat R.; DeMarzo, Peter M.; Hellwig, Martin F.; … - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010

We examine the pervasive view that “equity is expensive,” which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly and would affect credit markets adversely. We find that arguments made to support this view are either fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak. For example, the return on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693526

Does size of banks really matter? : evidence from CDS market data

Arslan, İlker - 2010

In this study we try to find that whether markets take into account the phenomenon of Too Big to Fail. With the help of … bank. We conclude that Too Big to Fail is not a valid term as thought but may be Too Profitable to Fail may be better …. -- Banking ; Too Big to Fail ; CDS Market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008857820

Crisis management at cross-roads : challenges facing cross-border financial institutions at the EU level : a joint publication with the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

Ayadi, Rym (ed.); Lierman, Frank (ed.); Balling, Morten (ed.) - Conference "Crisis Management at Cross-Roads" <2009, …; … - 2010

On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011706117

Does banks size distort market prices? Evidence for too-big-to-fail in the CDS market

Völz, Manja; Wedow, Michael - 2009

This paper examines the potential distortion of prices in the CDS market caused by too-big-to-fail. Overall, we find … investors expect a public bail-out as a result of too-big-to-fail. A one percentage point increase in size reduces the CDS …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010298782

A new capital regulation for large financial institutions

Hart, Oliver; Zingales, Luigi - 2009

We design a new, implementable capital requirement for large financial institutions (LFIs) that are too big to fail …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279652

Controlling banker's bonuses: Efficient regulation or politics of envy?

Matthews, Kent; Matthews, Owen - 2009

The positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk taking is a well established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in a chorus of demands to control banker’s bonuses and thereby curtail their risk taking activities in the hope that the world can avoid a repeat...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288817