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  • Search: subject:"Acyclic priority structure"
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Year of publication
Subject
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acyclic priority structure 4 Boston mechanism 2 Fairness 2 Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm 2 Student placement 2 couples 2 efficiency 2 matching 2 school choice 2 stability 2 top trading cycles 2 truncation 2 Acyclic priority structure 1 Couples 1 Efficiency 1 Nash equilibrium 1 fairness 1 student placement 1
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Online availability
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Free 2 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 4 Article 1
Language
All
Undetermined 3 English 2
Author
All
Klijn, Flip 5 Klaus, Bettina 3 Haeringer, Guillaume 2
Institution
All
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) 2 Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 2
Published in...
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UFAE and IAE Working Papers 2 Working Papers / Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) 2 International Journal of Game Theory 1
Source
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RePEc 5
Showing 1 - 5 of 5
Cover Image
Constrained School Choice
Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823987
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Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004
We study situations of allocating positions or jobs to students or workers based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of one or several entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for ``undergraduate student placement,''...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582634
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Cover Image
Constrained School Choice
Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547129
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Cover Image
Fair and efficient student placement with couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - In: International Journal of Game Theory 36 (2007) 2, pp. 177-207
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375543
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Cover Image
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004
We study situations of allocating positions to students based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for undergraduate student placement, acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547126
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