We examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed adaptive agents with common valuations learn to bid for a good. Despite the absence of private valuations, asymmetric information, or risk aversion, bidder strategies do not converge to the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium strategies...

The single decision maker chooses one of the actions repeatedly. She chooses the action with the highest weighted average of the past payoffs. In the long run either the action with highest expected payoff or the action with highest minimal payoff is chosen depending on how weights evolve.

We evaluate the empirical relevance of learning by private agents in an estimated medium-scale DSGE model. We replace the standard rational expectations assumption in the Smets and Wouters (2007) model by a constant-gain learning mechanism. If agents know the correct structure of the model and...

We explore the role of evolving beliefs regarding the structure of the macroeconomy in improving our understanding of the term structure of interest rates within the context of a simple macro-finance model. Using quarterly vintages of real-time data and survey forecasts for the United States...

We introduce the E-correspondence principle for stochastic dynamic expectations models as a tool for comparative dynamics analysis. The principle is applicable to equilibria that are stable under least squares and closely related learning rules. With this technique it is possible to study,...

Dieses vorläufige Papier beinhaltet keinerlei neuen Erkenntnisse, sondern fasst lediglich einige zentrale Aspekte der makroökonomischen Lerntheorie (siehe Evans, Honkajohja (2001)) knapp zusammen. Es wird der Frage nachgegangen ob rationale Erwartungsgleichgewichte lernbar sind. Lernen...

I introduce Expectational Business Cycles where aggregate activity fluctuates due to learning, heterogeneous updating rules and random changes in the social norm predictor.Agents use one of two updating rules to learn the equilibrium values while heterogeneity is dictated via an evolutionary...