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  • Search: subject:"Agenda control"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Agenda control 8 agenda control 5 Budget maximizing bureaucrat 2 Durable public good 2 Extended stepladder 2 General equilibrium theory of incomplete security markets 2 Hamiltonian path 2 Knockout tournament 2 Nash equilibrium 2 Neue politische Ökonomie 2 Pareto improvement 2 Public choice 2 Staatsoberhaupt 2 Theorie 2 USA 2 United States 2 Weak transitivity 2 1961-1986 1 Abstimmung 1 Abstimmungsregel 1 Agency problem 1 Agenda Control 1 Befragung 1 Bureaucracy 1 Bürokratie 1 Bürokratietheorie 1 Cabinet Formation 1 Cabinet instability 1 Coalition formation 1 Economic transition 1 European social policy 1 Financial innovation 1 Führungsstil 1 Head of state 1 Higher Education Research Institutes 1 Higher education institution 1 Hochschule 1 Interview 1 Israeli public sector 1 Leadership 1
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Online availability
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Free 7 Undetermined 7
Type of publication
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Article 12 Book / Working Paper 4
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 5 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 5 Article 1 Working Paper 1
Language
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English 10 Undetermined 6
Author
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Barseghyan, Levon 2 Bloch, Francis 2 Coate, Stephen 2 Dimitrov, Dinko 2 Hara, Chiaki 2 Rottier, Stéphane 2 Yang, Yongjie 2 Boockmann, Bernhard 1 Caglayan, Hulya 1 Carvalho, Teresa 1 Clinton, Joshua D. 1 Cotton, Christopher 1 Jenkins, Jeffery A 1 Martin, Patricia Y. 1 McCarty, Nolan M. 1 Mich, Ornella 1 Monroe, Nathan W 1 Nurmi, Hannu 1 O'Connor, Pat 1 O'Hagan, Clare 1 Poole, Keith T. 1 Rosenthal, Maoz 1 Saglamer, Gulsun 1 Tan, Mine G 1 Veronesi, Liria 1
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Institution
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Department of Economics, School of Business 1 Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain 1 Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University 1
Published in...
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Journal of Theoretical Politics 2 Constitutional Political Economy 1 Czech Economic Review 1 Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1 Economic Theory Bulletin 1 Economic theory bulletin 1 Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 Journal of Public Economics 1 Journal of public economics 1 KIER Working Papers 1 Leadership 1 Nota di Lavoro 1 Public choice 1 The journal of law, economics, & organization 1 Working Papers / Department of Economics, School of Business 1
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Source
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RePEc 9 ECONIS (ZBW) 5 EconStor 2
Showing 1 - 10 of 16
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Weak transitivity and agenda control for extended stepladder tournaments
Yang, Yongjie; Dimitrov, Dinko - In: Economic theory bulletin 9 (2021) 1, pp. 27-37
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012495270
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Weak transitivity and agenda control for extended stepladder tournaments
Yang, Yongjie; Dimitrov, Dinko - In: Economic Theory Bulletin 9 (2020) 1, pp. 27-37
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014504444
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The effect of majority party agenda setting on roll calls
Clinton, Joshua D. - In: Public choice 185 (2020) 3/4, pp. 459-483
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012302876
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Leadership practices by senior position holders in higher educational research institutes : stealth power in action?
O'Connor, Pat; Martin, Patricia Y.; Carvalho, Teresa; … - In: Leadership 15 (2019) 6, pp. 722-743
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012139477
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Partisan agenda control in the US house: A theoretical exploration
Jenkins, Jeffery A; Monroe, Nathan W - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 24 (2012) 4, pp. 555-570
While a number of scholars have focused on the importance of partisan agenda control in the US House, few have examined …-based positive and negative agenda control models. We show that the distribution of policy losses and benefits resulting from agenda … made worse off by the exercise of partisan agenda control, while those to the extreme side of the majority-party median …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011135460
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Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?
Nurmi, Hannu - In: Czech Economic Review 4 (2010) 1, pp. 005-017
control in various decision making bodies. This article argues that agenda control is extremely important in all collective … decision making bodies. Indeed, agenda control may render the voting power distribution issue largely irrelevant. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562480
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Pareto Improvement and Agenda Control of Sequential Financial Innovations
Hara, Chiaki - Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University - 2010
In an exchange economy under uncertainty with two periods, one physical good, and finitely many states of the world, we show that for every (complete or incomplete) market span there exists a sequence of securities such that if they are introduced into markets one by one, the prices of any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008763782
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Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda Setting Authority
Cotton, Christopher - Department of Economics, School of Business - 2010
Models of repeated legislative bargaining typically assume an agenda setter is randomly selected each period, even if the previous period agenda setter successfully passed a proposal. In reality, successful legislative agenda setters (e.g., speakers, committee chairs) tend to hold onto power. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684783
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Bureaucrats, voters, and public investment
Barseghyan, Levon; Coate, Stephen - In: Journal of Public Economics 119 (2014) C, pp. 35-48
This paper explores the provision of a durable public good in Romer and Rosenthal's agenda setter model. It identifies a type of equilibrium, called a Romer–Rosenthal equilibrium, in which in every period the bureaucrat proposes the maximum level of public investment the voter will support....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011077753
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Bureaucrats, voters, and public investment
Barseghyan, Levon; Coate, Stephen - In: Journal of public economics 119 (2014), pp. 35-48
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010492127
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