We compare Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV) and Plurality Voting (PV) in elections with 3 candidates. Voters receive consequential benefits from the election of a candidate close to their preferred policy position and also benefit from expressing their preferences sincerely. We provide conditions...

We consider a dynamic process of collective choice under majority rule in which a status quo policy evolves. The analysis is based on stochastic evolutionary game theory and relates the static solution concepts of social choice theory to a long-run equilibrium in a dynamic voting process. The...

Application of behavioral methodology in Political Economics shows that individuals are more susceptible to various cognitive biases which effects their decisions in the political field, resulting in action that is not based on their sincere choices. Using a voting game, this study aims to...

This paper extends an intergenerational context to the prospect of upward mobility hypothesis, showing that the poor majority in democracies may not support massive redistribution for the sake of their children’s educational attainment and upward mobility. We develop an overlapping generations...

Democratic direct voting on issues (in the form of referenda) suffers from the tyranny of the majority as well as potentially supporting extremist and populist positions. We state 4 fair voting principles for issue based voting, and show that current direct voting systems are not consistent with...

Agenda-setting power is a double-edged sword that increases the likelihood that an agent is chosen to be a proposer, but may reduce the probability that the agent is included in a winning coalition. We experimentally test the theoretical prediction of potentially negative returns to...

The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) is the probabilistic foundation that underlies jury decision-making and collective information aggregation at large. It has nonetheless been recognized that Condorcet's adoption of a statistically implausible premise – identical competence among all individuals...