We explore sequential voting in symmetric two-option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure. In unanimity games, (essentially) the whole set of equilibria is the same in all...

Previous investigations of strategic voting equilibria in mass electorates (Cox 1987, 1994; Palfrey; Myerson and Weber) have looked only at elections held under plurality rule electoral laws. This paper investigates such equilibria in multi-member districts operating under various largest-...

We focus on the Moulin-Shenker cost sharing rule as a natural extension of the serial rule to multi-service facilities where services are personalized. We show that it is the unique regular rule that is compatible with scale invariance and self consistency

Bagging (bootstrap aggregating) is a smoothing method to improve predictive ability under the presence of parameter estimation uncertainty and model uncertainty. In Lee and Yang (2006), we examined how (equal-weighted and BMA-weighted) bagging works for one-step-ahead binary prediction with an...

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economic performance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies, and...

In this paper, I tackle the question whether one share - one vote should become a European law rule. I examine, first of all, the economic theory concerning one share - one vote and its optimality, and the law and economics literature on dual class recapitalizations and other deviations from one...