Search Results - subject:"Approval voting."

Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists

Schofield, Norman - In: Review of economic design : RED 10 (2006) 3, pp. 183-203

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003411838

The status quo bias and reform of the common agricultural policy : impact of voting rules, the European Commission and external changes

Pokrivčák, Ján; Crombez, Christophe; Swinnen, Johan F. M. - In: European review of agricultural economics : ERAE 33 (2006) 4, pp. 562-590

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003412332

Another consideration in minority vote dilution remedies : rent-seeking

Lockard, Alan (contributor) - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 2 (2006) 3, pp. 397-421

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003558438

A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy

Tyran, Jean-Robert; Sausgruber, Rupert - In: European economic review : EER 50 (2006) 2, pp. 469-485

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003280425

Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation

Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Mathematical social sciences 51 (2006) 1, pp. 81-89

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003248402

United we vote

Eguia, Jon X. (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003258752

Political optimal tax policy making in a probabilistic voting framework

Lee, Sung-kyu - In: The Korean economic review 22 (2006) 1, pp. 99-130

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003738731

The euro zone Eastern enlargement: challenges to current members and the ECB

Sebea, Mihai - In: Romanian journal of european affairs 6 (2006) 4, pp. 41-52

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003657768

Computational Complexity in the Design of Voting Systems

Takamiya, Koji; Tanaka, Akira - 2006

This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting systems, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We point out that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059113

A simple "market value" bargaining model for weighted voting games : characterization and limit theorems

Owen, Guillermo; Lindner, Ines; Feld, Scott L.; … - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 35 (2006) 1, pp. 111-128

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012127425

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