This paper addresses the intricate challenge of establishing social discount rates across far-reaching generations, particularly in the face of divergent social viewpoints. We introduce several principles related to Dominant Unanimity, which enable non-dictatorial social discounting, and we...

I analyze Dutch panel data that contains rich information on voting, political opinions, and personality traits. I show that "adversarial" preferences - competitiveness, negative reciprocity, distrust, and selfishness - are strong predictors of right-wing and populist political preferences....

This paper considers a binary decision to be made by a committee - canonically, a jury - through a voting procedure. Each juror must vote on whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty. The voting rule aggregates the votes to determine whether the defendant is convicted or acquitted. We focus on...

ChatGPT has risen rapidly to prominence due to its unique features and generalization ability. This article proposes using ChatGPT to assist small investment funds, particularly small passive funds, in making more accurate and informed proxy voting decisions.Passive funds adopt a low-cost...

We consider a committee that consists of n members with one person one vote approving a proposal if the number of affirmative votes from the members reaches threshold k. Which threshold k between 1 and n is "good" for the committee? We suppose that if a new threshold k' proposed by some...

We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election...

We study pre-vote interactions in a committee that enacts a welfare-improving reform through voting. Committee members use decentralized promises contingent on the reform enactment to influence the vote outcome. Equilibrium promises prevent beneficial coalitional deviations and minimize total...

Consider a setting in which individual strict preferences need to be aggregated into a social strict preference relation. For two alternatives and an odd number of agents, it follows from May’s Theorem that the majority aggregation rule is the only one satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and...