This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment ag­gregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this intro­duction is to show how ideas from the...

Arrow (1950) initiates an economic model for democratic game, but ends up with a dictatorship conclusion. This paper combines the behaviors of politicians and voters to solve the democratic problem. It shows that democracy is costly. The cost and utility considerations give rise to winner or...

This paper examines the mechanisms by which a World Champion is chosen in the For-mula One Championship. Furthermore it is analysed whether there is a best method to do this. For this purpose we will discuss the methods used by the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA) since the...

We provide a respecification of an integer program characterization of Arrovian social welfare functions introduced by Sethuranam et al.(2003). By exploiting this respecification, we give a new and simpler proof of Theorem 2 in Kalai and Muller (1977).

The Arrow index of a fuzzy choice function C is a measure of the degree to which C satisfies the Fuzzy Arrow Axiom, a fuzzy version of the classical Arrow Axiom. The main result of this paper shows that A(C) characterizes the degree to which C is full rational. We also obtain a method for...

This article proves a very general version of the Kirman-Sondermann [Journal of Economic Theory, 5(2):267-277, 1972] correspondence by extending the methodology of Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 24(3):217-237, 1995]. The paper first proposes a unified framework...